In the pursuit of efficient habilitation, many service providers exercise a great deal of control over the lives of clients with developmental disabilities. For example, service providers often choose the client's habilitative goals, determine the daily schedule, and regulate access to preferred activities. This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of allowing clients to exercise personal liberties, such as the right to choose and refuse daily activities. On one hand, poor choices on the part of the client could hinder habilitation. On the other hand, moral and legal issues arise when the client's right to choice is abridged. Recommendations are offered to protect both the right to habilitation and the freedom to choose.
In the pursuit of efficient habilitation, many service providers exercise a great deal of control over the lives of clients with developmental disabilities (Guess, Benson, & Siegel-Causey, 1985; Kishi, Teelucksingh, Zollers, Park-Lee, & Meyer, 1988; Turnbull & Turnbull, 1985) . Service providers often choose the dient's habilitative goals, choose their work or day treatment setting, impose inflexible daily activity schedules, and regulate access to preferred activities. The choices made by the service provider may indeed promote habilitation, but these choices may not reflect the client's preferences. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relation between the right to habilitation and the client's right to personal liberties. The THE RIGHT TO HABIUTATION Habilitation involves teaching the skills needed to live as independently as possible (Favell, Favell, Riddle, & Risley, 1984) . A long history of inadequate services for people with developmental disabilities has been the impetus for numerous class action suits and legislative reforms guaranteeing these citizens a general right to habilitation. In the most well known of the class action suits, Wyatt v. Stickney (1971 Stickney ( , 1972 Stickney ( , 1975 , an Alabama court (and subsequently the Fifth Circuit Federal Court) determined that citizens with mental retardation have a "right to receive such individual habilitation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a more useful and meaningful life and to return to society" (Wyatt v. Stickney, 1975, p. 397) . On the basis of this ruling, the court set minimum standards that included individualized habilitation plans, a humane physical environment, and assurance of enough qualified staff to administer adequate treatment (Wyatt v. Stickney, 1975, p. 395) . Despite the Wyatt court's determined efforts to upgrade the standards for treatment, a constitutional right to habilitation has not yet been established. In fact, in a recent Supreme Court case, Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) , the Court guaranteed only as much habilitation as needed to ensure freedom from undue restraint. Bolton, 1973 (Skinner, 1971) . Choice is, presumably, a function of historical and existing reinforcement and punishment contingencies. Many of these contingencies are not readily apparent, making choice difficult to analyze and predict. How people make choices has been investigated in research on concurrent schedules of reinforcement (Catania, 1979) and has been described (with varying degrees of accuracy) with equations such as the matching law (Hermustein, 1970; McDowell, 1988) and with theories such as maximization and melioration (see Mazur, 1986) .
Because choice is difficult to analyze, some researchers have defined choice by the more apparent stimulus and contigency conditions. For example, Brigham (1979) (Lefcourt, 1973; Taylor & Brown, 1988 (Guess & SiegelCausey, 1985) . As a consequence, clients may not be motivated to achieve particular goals. They may resist particular teaching procedures. Staff may interpret this resistance as a failure in teaching technology when it could merely be an expression of preference Houghton, Bronicki, & Guess, 1987 (Turnbull, Turnbull, Bronicki, Summers, & Roeder-Gordon, 1989) .
3. Choice making is not often taught. Shevin and Klein (1984) assert that "our profession has focused on choice-making as a permissible activity, rather than as a teaching target" (p. 60). Many people require teaching to help them discover their own preferences and learn to make responsible choices. Unfortunately, we have given little attention to the development of curricula for teaching students to discriminate their preferences and make choices to obtain them (however, see Hazel, Deshler, Turnbull, & Osborne, 1988) . Further, perhaps due to lack ofchoice-making curricula, professional teacher training does not often indude methods on how to instruct clients in choice making.
4. Opportunities for choice are not often given Kishi et al., 1988; Knowlton, Turnbull, Backus, & Turnbull, 1988 Additionally, the pressure to please funding agencies, parents, and other consumers may compel direct care staff and teachers to "put on a show" when visitors arrive. This is often done with little sensitivity to the clients' preferences at the time.
It is dear that personal liberties can be easily denied. At issue is whether it is in the client's best interest to be allowed to exercise choice (Griffith & Coval, 1984) . Is it in the best interests of a client with significant independent living skill deficits to be allowed to skip a teaching session, choose a hobby over an academic habilitation goal, refuse to go on a shopping trip, or eat too many doughnuts and take a nap? Arguments supporting each side of the issue are discussed below.
ARGUMENTS OPPOSING THE RIGHT TO CHOICE The strongest argument against the right to choice is that many people with developmental disabilities may make bad choices (Shuman, 1975) . Society has chosen to treat minors in a similar manner because of their presumed inability to make competent decisions due to age.
Another argument against giving clients the right to choose is that allowing this freedom may hinder their acquisition of critical independent living skills (Knowlton et al., 1988 (Griffith & Coval, 1984) . The argument follows that abridging personal liberties in order to teach independent living skills is an appropriate tradeoff (Griffith & Coval, 1984; American Bar Association, 1975) . Some argue further that clients have an obligation to try to achieve the goals set in the interdisciplinary planning process (IPP) (Gardner & Chapman, 1985; VanBiervliet & Sheldon-Wildgen, 1981 (Knowlton et al., 1988; Perske, 1972; Turnbull et al., 1989; Veach, 1977; Wolfensberger, 1972 Harchik, Sherman, & Sheldon, 1989 ).
Effects of Choice on Preference
In studies that examined preference for choice, subjects were concurrently presented with two situations that were equivalent, except that choice was made available in only one of the situations. Individuals most frequently chose the situation in which choice was made available. For example, children chose to participate in tasks in which they had a choice of reinforcers more often than when the experimenter chose the same reinforcers for them (Brigham, 1979; Brigham & Sherman, 1973; Brigham & Stoerzinger, 1976) . Adolescents with developmental disabilities who engaged in stereotypic rocking more frequently chose a chair in which they could rock themselves over a chair rocked by the researchers at the same rate (Buyer, Berkson, Winnega, & Morton, 1987) . Rats and pigeons also preferred situations in which choice was available (Catania & Sagvolden, 1980; Voss & Homize, 1970) , suggesting that the effects of choice are not limited to humans.
Effects of Choice on Participation
Individuals appear to participate more in activities when opportunities for choice are available. Adolescents participated in group decision making more often when they determined consequences for their peers than when their teaching parents determined the consequences (Fixsen, Phillips, & Wolf, 1973) ; women who chose their own exercises had better attendance at a fitness dub than other women who were assigned the same exercises (Thompson & Wankel, 1980) ; undergraduates who chose whether to participate and what their reward would be, participated in a puzzle game during free time more often than others who had not been given either choice (Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, & Deci, 1978) ; and when office workers chose lottery tickets, they were less likely to sell or exchange their tickets before the drawing, even for tickets with better odds (Langer, 1975) .
Effects of Choice on Task Performance
Opportunities to make choices in a situation may improve performance. For example, children who were given a choice of treatments for recalling or recognizing words or losing weight performed somewhat better than other children who received that same treatment but had not chosen it (Berk, 1976; Mendonca & Brehm, 1983) . Similar effects were found with undergraduates who chose treatments for improving reading and study habits or for reducing fear of snakes (Champlin & Karoly, 1975; Devine & Fernald, 1973; Kanfer & Grimm, 1978) , with children who were allowed to choose art materials (Amabile & Gitomer, 1984) , and with undergraduates and older adults who could control the termination or duration ofshocks or noise (Glass, Singer, & Friedman, 1969; Reim, Glass, & Singer, 1971) . In a series of laboratory analogue studies, undergraduates who chose the words used in a paired-word learning task responded faster, learned the words faster, and learned more word pairs than others who did not choose (e.g., Perlmuter & Monty, 1973; Perlmuter, Scharff, Karsh, & Monty, 1980) . Conversely, however, Dyer, Dunlap, and Winterling (1989) and Newhard (1984) found the academic performance of children with severe disabilities to be the same whether or not they chose the task, materials, or reinforcers.
Finally, students have chosen their own consequences for performance on tasks. In some studies, student performance subsequently improved (Dickerson & Creedon, 1981; Lovitt & Curtiss, 1969) . In other studies, choice of consequences did not change the students' performance (Brigham & Sherman, 1973; Brigham & Stoerzinger, 1976; Felixbrod & O'Leary, 1973; Glynn, 1970) .
Effects of Choice on Problem Behavior
Problem behaviors appear to be exhibited less frequently when an individual has opportunities for choice. Autistic children exhibited fewer problem behaviors (e.g., aggression, self-injury) when they had a choice of tasks, materials, and reinforcers than when the therapist made these choices (Dyer et al., 1989) , and they demonstrated less social avoidance (e.g., looking and moving away) when they were engaged in activities that they preferred (Koegel, Dyer, & Bell, 1987) . Students with severe developmental disabilities demonstrated less aberrant behavior and greater compliance when they could control the pace of instructions during vocational tasks (Dobbins, 1988) . High school and college students demonstrated less noncompliance in completing tasks when they had opportunities for choice in the situation (Heilman & Toffler, 1976; Wright & Strong, 1982) .
Effects of Choice on Responses to Aversive Stimuli
Subjects who could control an aspect of an aversive situation (e.g., choice of the termination, duration, or presentation of shock, noise, or written tests) reported less discomfort and had less extreme autonomic responding than subjects who received the same stimulus but had no control over it (Corah & Boffa, 1970; DeGood, 1975; Geer, Davison, & Gatchel, 1970; Geer & Maisel, 1972; Stodand & Blumenthal, 1964) . Further, rats presented with escapable and avoidable shocks developed fewer gastric ulcers than those who received the same amount of shock that was inescapable and unavoidable (Weiss, 1971) ; infant boys who had opportunities to control the action of a mechanical toy were less likely to cry than other boys who did not have these opportunities (Gunnar-Vongnechten, 1978) ; and patients given a choice of two medical treatments were less likely to be depressed or anxious than patients assigned a treatment (Morris & Royle, 1988) .
Researrh Issues
A number of issues should be considered in attempting to analyze the generality and applicability of the research findings on choice. First, some methodological issues deserve consideration. Few of the studies used within-subject analyses with repeated measurement of the dependent variables; most employed between-subject group designs (e.g., Amabile & Gitomer, 1984) . This makes it difficult to determine the responses of individual subjects and the effects of the variables over time. Also, many studies used statistical procedures to analyze data. Although statistical significance was often obtained, inspection of the mean performance data presented for each group sometimes did not indicate strong clinical effects (e.g., Berk, 1976) . Further, some of the studies were conducted in analogue or laboratory situations and, thus, if choice did appear to have an effect, it is not dear whether the same effects would have occurred in more naturally occurring situations (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1978) . Finally, undergraduates were the subjects in a number of studies, and generality to other populations cannot be assured (e.g., Perlmuter et al., 1980) . Recently, however, researchers have begun to examine choice with single-subject designs under more naturally occurring conditions (e.g., Dyer et al., 1989; Kosiewicz, Hallahan, and Lloyd, 1981; Parsons, Reid, Bumgarner, & Reynolds, 1988) .
Another issue relates to the interaction between making a choice and receiving a preferred outcome; that is, the effects of choosing per se may be confounded by obtaining preferred outcomes. A few studies have examined this issue. The benefits in task performance associated with being assigned a preferred outcome were similar to those associated with choosing a preferred outcome (Kosiewicz et al., 1981; Parsons et al., 1988) ; however, choice of outcome was preferred by subjects over assignment of singular outcomes (Brigham & Sherman, 1973) .
Finally, in most of the studies, subject perception of whether or not they made choices was rarely assessed. As Langer (1983) Turnbull et al., 1989; Turnbull & Turnbull, 1985) . The preferences of clients with severe and profound disabilities can be assessed through observation and analysis of their responses to various skills, teaching procedures, and other stimuli (see preference assessment procedures in Caldwell, Taylor, & Bloom, 1986; Green et al., 1988; Mithaug & Hanawalt, 1978; Pace, Ivancic, Edwards, Iwata, & Page, 1985; Wacker, Berg, Wiggins, Muldoon, & Cavanaugh, 1985) . For example, Pace et al. (1985) and Green et al. (1988) determined stimuli preferred by persons with severe and profound retardation by assessing each client's approach to and avoidance of each target stimulus.
Preference scales or checklists are also available to aid service providers in determining client choices (see Becker & Ferguson, 1969; Goode & Gaddy, 1976; Helmstetter, Murphy-Herd, Roberts, & Guess, 1984; Kishi et al., 1988; Turnbull et al., 1989) . These assessments can be conducted by interviewing the client or by interviewing those who know the client well. These reports of client preferences can then be validated through use.
The crux of the issue is that interdisciplinary teams (educational or residential) should not make decisions about the client's future without client input (Bennett, 1981) . Rather, client preferences, whether stated by the client or determined from observational data, should be considered highly. Further, once the residential or educational plan is implemented, service providers and teachers should continue to observe, evaluate, and talk to the client, being open to changes that reflect client preferences.
3. Clients should be taught how to choose (Brown et al., 1980; Shevin & Klein, 1984; Turnbull & Turnbull, 1985) . It should be part of their learning curriculum and "subject to task analysis, planning, implementation, and evaluation" (Shevin & Klein, 1984, p. 160) . Unfortunately, only a few tested curricula are available for teaching choice. For example, Hazel at al. (1988) developed and tested a curriculum to teach skills (including decision making, negotiation and communication) to adolescents with mild mental retardation. Their findings showed that the adolescents used these skills to obtain some of their preferences.
A number of other materials may be useful in teaching clients to make choices. First, Wuerch and Voeltz (1982) developed a leisure skills training program for persons with severe disabilities that includes suggestions for teaching choice making. Henning and Dalrymple (1986) presented a program for teaching a youth with autism to choose leisure materials. Guess and Helmstetter (1986) , in their instructional curriculum for persons with severe disabilities, described teaching choice making in natural situations.
Other researchers and educators offer suggestions (as opposed to complete teaching curricula) about what to teach in order to prepare clients for making choices. For example, Shevin and Klein (1984) recommended teaching concepts like "choose, now, later, I want, and I do not want, etc." Guess, Sailor, and Baer (1976) described procedures to teach functional use of "yes" and "no." Reese (1986) showed that some clients learned to make complex decisions by listing options, discussing advantages and disadvantages of each option, and choosing the best option.
To ensure that clients are taught to make choices, teachers and other service providers should be well trained in this area and should be accountable for teaching and providing opportunities for choice. This means that institutions should address the need for teacher and residential stafftraining so that staffand teachers will be well prepared to encourage and teach choice making. Finally, educating teachers and staff about client's rights may decrease the likelihood of teachers or staff allowing competing interests (e.g., saving time and effort) to predude the dient's right to choice.
4. Clients at every functioning level should be given opportunities to make choices in their residential and work settings, within and between scheduled activities. Some dients might only be able to make simple choices initially (e.g., what dessert to eat, when to go to bed). Other clients might learn to make more complicated decisions (e.g., how to spend a workshop paycheck, how to handle a problem with another client). Staff members must be motivated to provide these opportunities for choice. Supervisors can enhance staff motivation by setting up contingencies for these activities (e.g., a program of observation, feedback, and reward). Also, activity schedules should be set up to allow time for choice.
Client refusals, bad choices, and off-task behavior should signal staff to examine the situation and to determine whether allowing more choice or teaching more choices would be of benefit (Griffith & Coval, 1984; Shevin & Klein, 1984 
